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III.—HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION.¹

BY J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

LAST year I had the honour of laying before the Society an attempt at an explanation of Hegel's doctrine of the Subjective Notion. In continuing this to the Objective Notion, I should wish to take up the same position as before. The views I put before you I believe to be substantially the same as those of Hegel. But the point on which I would wish that discussion might turn is the intrinsic correctness of these views, and not their fidelity to the text.

The Objective Notion does not present so many difficulties as the preceding division. It is far less elaborately subdivided than the Subjective Notion, and (with the exception of the category of Chemism) it is much less influenced by attempts to make the development of the Logic correspond exactly to the divisions of some finite science. We shall, I think, find it necessary to criticise less, and be able to confine ourselves almost entirely to exposition.

The Objective Notion is the second division of the Doctrine of the Notion. It is divided into three sections, Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology. The subdivisions of Chemism, which are only to be found in the *Greater Logic*, we may omit from consideration, for reasons which will be perceived when we come to that category. Mechanism is divided into Formal Mechanism, Mechanism with Affinity, and Absolute Mechanism. (These are the names given in the *Smaller Logic*. The names are different in the *Greater Logic*, and each division is again subdivided, but the argument is substantially the same.) Teleology again is subdivided into the Subjective End, the Means, and the Realised End. (These names are only found in the *Greater Logic*. In the *Smaller Logic* no names are given although the divisions are found.)

Two of these categories bear, it will be noticed, the names of physical sciences. This has the same significance as the use of the terms of formal logic in the Subjective Notion. The categories of Mechanism and Chemism do not apply

¹ Read before the Aristotelian Society.

only to the subject matter of Mechanics and Chemistry. Like all categories each of them is a predicate—more or less accurate—of all reality. Still less is it the case that an attempt is made by pure thought to deduce all the special characteristics of Mechanics and Chemistry as empirical sciences. What Hegel means by the names is that the most striking instances of the uses of the categories which he has called Mechanism and Chemism are to be found in the sciences of Mechanics and Chemistry. (We shall, I think, find reason to doubt this view about Chemism.) The use of the category is not confined to the science after which it is named, nor has the category anything to do with the empirical details of that science, but it is the form of pure thought which the science most naturally and usually employs.

Why is the part of the logic which we are considering called the Objective Notion? It is clearly meant as an antithesis to the title of Subjective Notion given to the previous division. Now we saw reason in our last paper to reject the view that Subjective here meant the inner as opposed to the outer. It must rather mean the particular, contingent, and capricious, as opposed to the universal, necessary, and reasonable. And we saw there that the Subjective Notion began by dealing with systems of classification which were contingent and capricious, and finally ended in a system of classification which was universal and necessary. This result is inherited by the next division of the Logic. All the systematisations made in the different stages of the Objective Notion claim to be, not classifications we *may* adopt, like those in the earlier stages of the Subjective Notion, but, on the contrary, classifications which express the whole nature of the reality, and which therefore we *must* adopt. It is on this account that it is entitled to the name of Objective.

In considering the transition from the Subjective to the Objective Notion, I should wish to refer to my paper on the Subjective Notion (MIND, 1897, p. 171). The conclusion there arrived at was that "things are doubly connected—by similarity and by causation. And it is obvious that a thing may be, and generally is, connected by the one tie to things very different from those to which it is connected by the other." I submitted that the dialectic "first takes up the relation of similarity, and works it out through the course of the Subjective Notion. Then, in the Objective Notion, it proceeds to work out the relation of determination—not going back arbitrarily to pick it up, but led on to it again by dialectical necessity, since the Subjective Notion, when fully

worked out, shows itself to have a defect which can only be remedied by the further development of the idea of determination."

We concluded that the final result reached in the Subjective Notion might be expressed as "the conception of a regular system of laws proceeding from the more general to the less general, embracing at the top the whole of reality in a single unity, and at the bottom accounting for every quality in every individual" (MIND, 1897, p. 357).

But now that the Subjective Notion is worked out to its highest point its inherent one-sidedness comes to the front—namely, its omission of connexion by determination. And this shows itself in an imperfection which becomes apparent in the highest form of the Subjective Notion. According to that form the highest type of knowledge is, Every A is either B or C. But such knowledge is necessarily incomplete. For of any given A, we know it is either B or C, but we do not know which it is. And yet it is certain that it *is* one of them, and it is no more the other than it is X or Y. How is this to be determined? All that the Subjective Notion can do for us is to class A₁ under the general head A, and *ex hypothesi* this cannot determine whether it is B or C. (If we put the position, as Hegel does, in the form of a disjunctive syllogism, the question will take the form, How do we get the minor premiss, A is not C?) We require a further determination of objects which their inner nature, as we are able at this stage of the dialectic to understand it, cannot give us. What can remain? It can only be determination from outside. And thus we are naturally led back at the end of the Subjective Notion to the conception of the reciprocal connexion of objects by determination—that very conception which we had temporarily ignored while dealing with the Subjective Notion. Thus the argument takes the course that, from the nature of the dialectic, might be anticipated. When we left one element of Reciprocity behind, and, in the Thesis of the Doctrine of the Notion, devoted ourselves to developing the other side only, we could predict that the incompleteness thus created would require us to develop the other element of Reciprocity in the Antithesis. And this is exactly what has happened. We are now on the point of beginning the Antithesis—namely, the Objective Notion, and the course of the argument has led us back to the ignored element of Reciprocity.

I am aware that this is not the way in which Hegel himself makes the transition from the Subjective to the Objective Notion (cp. *Encyclopadia*, section 193, and *Werke*, vol. v.,

p. 170.) But it appears necessary to differ from him on this point, for three reasons. In the first place, this view of the relation between the Subjective and Objective Notions seems the only one by which we can account for the difficult transition between Reciprocity and the Subjective Notion (cp. *MIND*, 1897, pp. 170-173). In the second place, Hegel's transition leaves the special and characteristic defect of the Subjective Notion—its powerlessness to determine which of the possible alternatives is real—unnoticed and untranscended. And, finally, Hegel's transition does not seem convincing in itself. The line of his argument appears to be that at the end of the Subjective Notion the mediation is merged, that this produces immediacy, and that this forms the transition to the Object. But how has the mediation been merged, so that we can pass to the immediate Object? Surely it has not been completely merged. The highest point of the Subjective Notion, as we saw, is found in the proposition A is either B or C. This may be said to be an immediate connexion between A on the one hand, and B and C on the other. But in any particular object A will be connected with B or C—not with both. A still requires mediation to determine whether, in this case, it is to be B or C, and it is rather the necessity of this mediation, as we have seen, and not the transcending of all mediation, which takes us on to the Objective Notion.

MECHANISM.

Hegel begins by remarking that the Object, which he takes to begin with as single, splits itself up "into distinct parts each of which is itself the totality" (*Enc.*, section 194). He accounts for this by means of the immediacy which he takes to be the special characteristic, at this stage, of the Objective Notion. But, even on my view of transition to the Objective Notion, the breaking up of the Object remains intelligible. At the end of the Subjective Notion we had, not indeed a blank unity, but a system of objects completely united, and united—this is the essential point—by their inner natures, and not by any merely external relation. Now when we pass from connexion by similarity to connexion by determination, we leave this union by inner nature behind us. If we look at things as they determine one another, we find them connected indeed, but, so far, connected only in an external way. They no longer form a single unity, but, on the contrary, an aggregate of objects, secondarily connected, no doubt, but primarily separated.

Of course this does not mean that the union by inner nature has been disproved or abolished. It is still there. But we have seen that, by itself, it cannot account for reality, and that it must be supplemented by the principle of connexion by determination. The objects which are determining one another have still their inner natures, as those have been expounded in the Subjective Notion. But we are now considering them as determining one another, and from that point of view they must be looked at as separate, since their relations are external. Thus the reality, which was previously looked at as primarily a whole, is now looked at as primarily a plurality, or, in Hegelian language, the totality breaks up into distinct parts.

The Objects are, then, at first taken as merely externally connected. Mechanics is the science which has the strongest tendency to treat the external relations of objects as entirely independent of their inner natures and, therefore, Hegel calls the first division of the Objective Notion by the name of Mechanism. Of this the first and most extreme form is

FORMAL MECHANISM.

The definition of this, as often happens in the dialectic, is identical with that of the larger division, of which it is the first subdivision. The two other subdivisions modify and correct the characteristic idea of Mechanism. But in Formal Mechanism it is given in its full extent. Each object enters into external relations with all others outside it, but these external relations are not affected by, and do not affect, the internal nature of the objects related.

A theory so extreme as this can only be accepted, with regard to objects of experience, as a methodological expedient. It may sometimes be convenient to consider objects, for some particular and limited purpose, *as if* their external relations had no influence on their inner nature, or their inner nature on their external relations. But experience teaches us, too plainly to be disregarded, that every external event that happens to any object of experience *does* effect its inner nature, and that, on the other hand, the external relations into which objects enter are largely determined by what the objects are.

Atoms, however, cannot be directly perceived, and in their case, therefore, empirical knowledge is powerless to check the errors of theory. And Atomism has got very near, sometimes, to the position of Formal Mechanism. It would not indeed assert that the inner nature of the atoms was entirely

a matter of indifference to their outer relations. They could not, for example, repel one another, except by some property of impenetrability. But it has been asserted that a change in their outer relations makes no change in their inner nature, and that the inner nature, on the other hand, has no influence in deciding which, of various possible relations, should be the one into which they actually should enter.

Hegel says in the *Greater Logic* (*Werke*, vol. v., p. 183) that this is the standpoint of Determinism. The name does not, at first sight, seem very appropriate, since one of the chief characteristics of the category is that the inner nature of the thing is not determined by its outer relations. But it is the determination of the outer relations to which Hegel refers here, and the significance of the name is negative. It refers to the absence of any *self-determination* on the part of the Object. If we ask why it is determined in this way rather than that, we can only attribute it to determination by another Object, which, in its turn, must be determined by a third, and so on indefinitely. In no case can the Object be self-determined, because in no case can the inner nature of the Object have anything to do with its determinations.

Such a determinism would lead to a morality not unlike that of the Stoics. For morality is in the long run concerned only with the inner states of people—though not of course only with the inner state of the individual moral agent. If every one was good and happy in himself, all external relations would be quite indifferent to morality, which only cares for external things in so far as they affect goodness or happiness. And if the inner nature of man, as of all other Objects, was independent of his external relations, then, whatever his circumstances, it would be in each man's power to be free, virtuous and happy. Such a view would of course tend to produce absolute indifference to the affairs of the outside world, and forms a striking contrast to the despairing Fatalism, which we shall see to be the ethical correlate of Mechanism with Affinity.

How does this category demonstrate its insufficiency? The important point for this is the fact that each of these Objects, which are only externally related, has not only an inner nature, but an inner nature determined in the way expounded in the Subjective Notion. It is this which breaks down the category and carries us on to the next, and I should like to call attention to this as an incidental confirmation of my view as to the relation of the Subjective and Objective Notions. For it fully explains and justifies the postponement of the consideration of connexion by determination until connexion

by similarity had been dealt with. It was not merely due, as might have been previously supposed, to the impossibility of considering two things at once. On the contrary, there was the positive and definite reason that, until the inner nature of objects had been developed, it would be impossible to pass out of the simplest and crudest form of connexion by determination.

In the earlier stages of Essence there would have been no contradiction in such a category as Mechanism. For there the Essence and the Appearance were conceived as realities which, though connected, possessed independent qualities. To determine the Appearance would not be to determine the Essence, and thus the inner nature of a thing could remain unaffected by its outer relations.

Even when the category of Reciprocity was reached, all we could have said of the assertion of the independence of the inner and the outer was not that it was false, but that it was unmeaning. For things, looked at under the category of Reciprocity, had no inner nature at all. It is true that they had those relations of Likeness and Unlikeness, out of which, as the Subjective Notion progressed, an inner nature developed. But at the end of Essence and the beginning of the Notion these relations also were purely external. They did not become an inner nature of the things that possessed them until the justification of Universal Judgments, in the course of the Subjective Notion, showed us that they were not accidents of Individuals, but, on the contrary, essential to the existence of those Individuals.

At the point which we have now reached, however, the matter is entirely different. Every Object, the Subjective Notion has taught us, must have an inner nature. And in the course of the Doctrine of Essence we learned that, if anything has an inner nature at all, it cannot be *merely* inner, that it, and the whole of it, must be manifested by the outside of the object—that is, by its external relations. And, conversely, no outer nature can be entirely outer. There can no more be anything in appearance which has not its root in Essence, than there can be anything in Essence which does not manifest itself in appearance.

And thus the category of Formal Mechanism contains a clear contradiction. The inner nature of an Object, it demands, shall be indifferent to its external relations of determination. These external relations belong somehow, and in some respects, to the Object, or there would be no meaning in calling them the external relations of that Object. They are not its inner nature. They must therefore be its

outer side, or part of its outer side. The category of Formal Mechanism, therefore, demands an Outer which has no relation to the Inner. And this is just what was proved in the Doctrine of Essence to be impossible.

If we wish to look at the question in a more concrete way, we may ask ourselves how much knowledge of the inner nature of an Object would be left us if we abstracted all knowledge of the effects which it produced on other Objects, and of the reactions by which it responded to the influences exerted on it from outside. The answer would certainly be that all knowledge of the inner nature would have vanished, and the conclusion to be drawn is that it is impossible to separate inner nature and outer relations.¹

Or, looking at the other side, we may ask what meaning could be given to the statement that a relation x was a relation of A and B, if it did not affect the inner nature of either, and therefore made no difference to either of them. Why in this case should we call x a relation of A and B rather than of C and D? As Lotze points out (*Logic*, section 338) a relation of things cannot be merely *between* them. It is *in* them, or it is nowhere.

If then the outer relations and inner nature of the object are not absolutely independent, how do they stand to one another? The *prima facie* assumption, since they at any rate profess to be different, is that they are two separate realities, acting on one another. The arguments given above, indeed, suggest that the connexion is closer than this, but Hegel prefers to approach the truth gradually, by stating and transcending this view of the interaction of separate realities. This forms the second subdivision of Mechanism, and he entitles it:—

MECHANISM WITH AFFINITY.

This is a somewhat perplexing title, nor is the original (*Differenter Mechanismus*) much clearer. The *Smaller Logic* is scarcely of any use here, owing to the very condensed way in which Hegel treats the subdivisions of Mechanism. By

¹ It may be objected that it is possible to form an idea of the inner nature of the universe, although it has nothing outside it with which it can enter into relations. But the universe is not a single Object, but a differentiated unity of parts, each of which is to be regarded as a centre of reality. It is the relations between these which constitute the inner nature of the universe. But the Objects which we are now considering are not systems of centres. They are single centres, and, except for their external relations, would be blank unities, and therefore non-entities.

the aid of the *Greater Logic*, however, it is possible to catch the meaning of the category. The outer relations and the inner nature influence one another, and the significance of the name appears to be that one Object is no longer as suitable as another to enter into any particular relations. Since the inner nature has some influence on the outer relations, it is only those Objects whose inner nature is of a particular kind which are capable of entering into particular relations.

To this category, Hegel says (*Werke*, vol. v., p. 192), belongs the idea of Fate—a blind Fate, conceived as crushing and ignoring the individuals who are in its power. This conception of the sacrifice of the individual to the order of things outside him could not have arisen in the category of Formal Mechanism, since there the interior of any Object was quite untouched by, and could not be sacrificed to, external circumstances. And in the next category, that of Absolute Mechanism, the opposition between inner and outer is replaced by the perception of their unity, and with it goes the idea of Fate as an alien and crushing power—to return again, on a higher level, in the category of Life, but to be again transcended by the category of Cognition. But, between Formal and Absolute Mechanism, our present category is precisely the proper sphere of Fate. For outside and inside are connected just so much that the former may act on the latter, just so little that there is no harmony between them. Fate has the individual Objects in its power, "*subjectos tanquam suos, viles tanquam alienos*".

The Stoicism which is the characteristic moral of Formal Mechanism necessarily leads on, if we do not refuse to look facts in the face, to the Fatalism which is characteristic of Mechanism with Affinity. It is all very well to say that every man has the power to be free, virtuous and happy under any circumstances. But the circumstances may include a badly trapped sewer which sends him out of the world, or a blow on the head which sends him into an asylum, or an education which leaves him with a complete ignorance of virtue, or a lively distaste for it. It is useless trying to escape from our circumstances. Such an "escape from Fate is itself the most unhappy of all Fates," as Hegel says. For the attempt at escape deprives us of our power over them, while it by no means deprives them of their power over us.

Fortunately this rather depressing category passes like the rest. If we consider more closely, we shall see that it is really impossible for the inner nature of an Object to be crushed. If we call this inner nature *xyz*, then one of two

alternatives follows. Either the Object has this inner nature, or it has not. If it has it, it has it, and the inner nature is not crushed, but, on the contrary, exists in its fulness. But if it has it not, then this *xyz* is not the Object's inner nature at all, and the Object is not in the least crushed or thwarted because it is not *xyz*. Why *should* it be *xyz*, if in point of fact it *is* not?

(Of course all this would not apply if we were speaking of self-conscious individuals—Objects who were in the fullest sense *for* self. In the case of any being with a power of conscious self-determination, the inner nature will include an ideal of some sort, and if outside circumstances prevent that ideal from being realised, then we can intelligibly speak of the inner nature being thwarted. For the inner nature in such a case is not *merely* a fact, but it is a fact which is a demand, and a demand can be real and yet unsatisfied. But we are not here dealing with self-conscious beings, and therefore the argument of the last paragraph will hold.)

How then can we get out of the contradiction in which this category involves us? We can be delivered from it by a line of argument which I have already more or less anticipated when criticising Formal Mechanism. There can, in fact, be no opposition between inner nature and outer relations, because there is no difference between them. All we mean by the inner nature of the Object is the general laws which determine the manner in which it does enter into relations. The inner nature of glass, for example, is just that it can scratch wax and cannot be scratched by it, that it cannot scratch diamonds, while diamonds can scratch it, and so on. If we try to think of any inner nature of the Object which is not expressed in the various actions and reactions, actual or possible, which the Object enters into, we absolutely fail.

And, while there is thus no inner nature which is not also outside relations, it is equally true that there are no outside relations which are not an expression of inner nature. This is often thrown into the background by the practical utility of considering one of the two terms in a relation as purely passive. But this is only a convenient inaccuracy. Everything which, as we say, "happens to" an Object, is really a manifestation of its inner nature. A *tabula rasa* is the stock example of something passive, and the active co-operation of the wax in the work of writing is not obvious on the surface. But when we consider how very different the result would have been if an attempt had been made to write on water, or on diamonds, it becomes evident that the

wax is really reacting as actively on the pencil, as gun-powder does on a match.

The result which we thus reach is not unlike the discovery in the Doctrine of Being, that Being-for-another is really Being-for-self. The inner nature of each Object is really identical with its relations to all other Objects, and we thus pass to the category of—

ABSOLUTE MECHANISM.

Since Hegel has correlated Formal Mechanism with Determinism, and Mechanism with Affinity with Fatalism, we might venture to carry on the process by comparing Absolute Mechanism with Spinoza's doctrine of Freedom. According to Spinoza, everything and everybody is free. For Freedom only consists in acting according to your nature, and there is, of course, no power in the universe (yourself included) which could possibly make you do anything not according to your nature.

This is doubtless true as far as it goes. But it does not go as far as Spinoza thinks, who endeavours to find in it a basis for resignation, if not for optimism. For this it is insufficient, for the reasons pointed out above. If we are to mean by Freedom anything which is of the least value to spirit, it must mean acting, not merely according to our nature, but according to our desires and, ultimately, our ideals. Supposing that I get toothache when I sit near a window, or feel jealous when I see my superiors, I shall certainly be acting according to my nature, but that will not make me feel that toothache and jealousy are desirable or ideal, and there will be a painfully true sense in which I can say that my freedom is interfered with by each of them. The only valuable freedom must be sought elsewhere—not in indeterminism indeed, but in self-realisation. But this comes later in the dialectic.

According to the Category of Absolute Mechanism, every Object is the centre of a system composed of all the other Objects which influence it. As everything in the universe stands in reciprocal connexion with everything else, it follows that each of these systems embraces the whole of reality, and that they are distinguished from one another by the fact that each has a different centre.

The central Object in each system is called by Hegel the Universal. Its best claim to that name seems to be that it alone in the system is to be looked on as self-determined. It is determined, in the first place, by all the surrounding

Objects. But, since these determinations only serve to bring out its own inner nature, it may be said to be self-determined. On the other hand, the surrounding Objects are looked at only as determining, not as determined at all, and so not self-determined. (Of course this only refers to the systems in which they are the determining Objects. Each of them has its own system, in which it is the central Object and therefore Universal.) The relations which connect the Universal with the Individuals are called by Hegel the Particular.

From another point of view the central Object may derive the title of Universal from the fact that it is the point of meeting of the other two terms, since only in that particular Object would the influence of the surrounding Objects produce just those actions and reactions. This is what Hegel seems to have been thinking of when he remarks that either the determining Objects or the relations could be taken as the Universal, as well as the determined Object. For we may consider the determining Objects as the bond of union between the central Object and the relations—since it is only these determinants which could enter into just those relations with that centre. Or we may consider the relations as the bond between the determining and the determined Objects, since those Objects could only be united by those relations. But this does not seem as deep a meaning for Universality as the one suggested in the last paragraph, and the successive transformation of the determining Objects and the relations into the Universal appears to have no influence on the general argument.

It should be noticed that the example of this category given by Hegel in both the *Greater* and the *Smaller Logic* is misleading. He there makes the State, or the Government, take the place of what I have called the central Object, while the citizens are the determining Objects. Now the State does not differ from the citizens as one citizen does from another, but is generically different. And both State and Government are, in their own nature, and not merely when specially taken as centres, realities of a more universal nature than individual citizens are. And thus the example would suggest that there are some Objects which are by their nature fitted to be the central Objects of systems, while others are assigned to the humbler position of determining Objects. But this, as we have seen, would be a mistake. For every possible Object is equally subject to Mechanism with Affinity, and we saw in the course of the deduction that every Object subject to Mechanism

with Affinity became the centre of a system of Absolute Mechanism.

Indeed we may say that the example, in the form which it takes in the *Smaller Logic*,¹ is not only misleading, but incorrect. For there he speaks of the State as the central Object. Now the State is not an Object distinct from the citizens, which can act and react on them, as each of them does on the rest. It is, as no one realised more thoroughly than Hegel, a unity of which the individual citizens are the parts. It is, no doubt, for Hegel, a real unity, not a mere aggregate, but on the other hand it is a unity which only exists in the citizens, and not side by side with them. Now this is a conception too advanced for Absolute Mechanism. For the conception of a system which is also a unity we shall have to wait for the category of Teleology, and conceive the State, not as an Object side by side with its citizens, but as the principle of their unity.

Hegel now passes from Absolute Mechanism to the next category. In his own words (*Enc.*, section 199) "the immediacy of existence, which the objects have in Absolute Mechanism, is implicitly negated by the fact that their independence is derived from, and due to, their connexions with each other, and therefore to their own want of stability". In other words, the whole nature of each Object lies in the relations between it and other Objects. But each of these relations does not belong exclusively, *ex hypothesi*, to the one Object, but it shares it with the others. The nature of wax consists, for example, partly in the fact that it is melted by fire. But this melting is just as much part of the nature of the fire. The fact is shared between the wax and the fire, and cannot be said to belong to one of them more than the other. It belongs to both of them jointly.

We must notice in passing that this would not be true of self-conscious beings. Our emotions and perceptions are the result of the action of outside Objects on us, but there is a very intelligible meaning in saying that my pain is more my quality than it is that of the stone which hit me. But

¹The example, in the form in which it is given in the *Greater Logic* (*Werke*, vol. v., p. 197), can scarcely be called positively incorrect. For Hegel does not speak there, as he does in the *Smaller Logic* (*Enc.*, section 198), of both Staat and Regierung, but of Regierung only. And if we take Regierung, as Hegel probably did, to mean a separate class—the king, civil servants, etc.—it would form a separate Object by the side of the citizens, which could enter into relations of Mechanism with them. But the example would still be misleading, as suggesting an intrinsic difference between those Objects which were fitted to be central Objects, and those which were not.

this is because there is, in a self-conscious being, a principle of unity higher than anything which we have attained in the Object. In dealing with simple Objects we must, I think, admit Hegel's argument that the relation is no more the quality of one Object than of the other.

The only subject of which the relation can be predicated will be the system which these two Objects form. The qualities will belong to this system, and it will be the true unity. But again, two Objects cannot form a closed system, since all Objects in the universe are in natural connexion. Our system of two Objects will have relations with others, and will be merged with them, in the same way that the original Objects were merged in it—since the relations, which alone give individuality, are found to be common property, and so merge, instead of keeping distinct. The system in which all the Objects, and all their relations, are contained, becomes the reality—the only true Object, of which all the relations contained in the system are adjectives. The individual Objects disappear, and we find ourselves in the category of—

CHEMISM.

This is a very perplexing category, and I must confess that Hegel's treatment of it seems to me to require emendation. There is in it, Hegel says, an oscillation between a Neutral Object on the one hand, and, on the other hand, two extremes, separate, but connected and in a state of tension. I do not think that it is possible to doubt that Hegel intended to give us here, not an alternation of categories, but a category of alternation. It is not, according to him, that we alternately look on reality as a neutral object and as a tension of extremes, but that we hold throughout the whole of Chemism a position which asserts that reality itself continually passes from one of these forms to the other.

The passage from Absolute Mechanism to Chemism—this appears to be Hegel's meaning—gives us the neutral object. But the neutral object is undifferentiated, "it has sunk back to immediacy". It has therefore no true unity. So it splits up into the extremes. But the extremes, being "biased and strained,"—that is, in connexion with one another, fall back into the neutral object, and the process goes on *ad infinitum*.

To the validity of this line of argument I wish to suggest three objections. (a) In the first place, what right has Hegel to make a neutral object the result of the transition from

Absolute Mechanism? There was nothing in that transition to abolish differentiation. The various relations in which the differentiation consists, were by no means destroyed. All that was done was that they were lumped together, and attributed to a single logical subject—the system—instead of to the plurality of Objects which had been previously their logical subjects. This will not give us a neutral object, such as Hegel requires here.

(b) In the second place, if such a neutral object was reached, it would not split up into extremes, as Hegel wants it to do, but would vanish altogether. Such a neutral object could have nothing outside it, for it is to be coextensive with a mechanical system, and we have seen that every mechanical system is coextensive with the universe. And, again, the neutral object, being undifferentiated, could have nothing inside it. It would have therefore to be an absolutely blank reality. And the very first step in the Logic taught us that an absolutely blank reality was equivalent to absolute nothing. Consequently, even if the dialectic did get to the neutral object, it would never be able to pass from that to the connected extremes.

(c) But even supposing that this could be done, and the perpetual oscillation between neutral and extremes could be established, where is the contradiction in this that could take us on to the next category? It may be said that this continual oscillation is a False Infinite, and that a False Infinite is in itself a contradiction. But this, I think, is a mistake. There is nothing contradictory about a False Infinite except in those cases where the completion of the series is required—when of course there is an obvious contradiction. It was for this reason that the False Infinite involved a contradiction in the category of Being-for-another. A, by the hypothesis, was determined. But it was determined by B. So it could not be determined till B was determined. B was determined by C. Therefore, till C was determined, B could not be determined, nor, as a consequence, A. But C was determined by D, and so on *ad infinitum*. A, therefore, could not be determined till an endless series was ended. Therefore it could not be determined at all. But, by the hypothesis, it was determined, which gives a contradiction.

Here, however, the infinite series is not wanted to determine its first members. It can never be completed, but there is no contradiction if it *is* never completed. And therefore there is no ground for the transition to the next category.

I should venture to suggest a reconstruction of the category. The essential characteristic of it should be, I suggest, not the abolition of all differentiation, but, as appears in the transition from Absolute Mechanism, the reference of all the differentiation to a unity which is itself single and undifferentiated. The emphasis, you may say, is changed. In Absolute Mechanism we had, indeed, a unity of a sort, for we had a system. But the fundamental point was the plurality of objects, with their relations, and the unity was only derivative—an effect of the plurality. And in Chemism, on this theory, we shall have a differentiation of relations, but all springing out of, referred to, and dependent on a unity which is taken as devoid of plurality.

In this form the category, as we have seen, follows quite naturally from Absolute Mechanism. The latter had attempted to explain reality by the interaction of a plurality of Objects. But the relations, belonging as they did to the Objects jointly, so far from distinguishing one Object from another, rather merged them together, and as the Objects had no distinguishing qualities except their relations, there was nothing to keep them apart. They ran together, and were fused in one single Object, occupying the whole extent previously occupied by the system of Objects, and of this Object all the relations became an attribute.

This then would be the process by which we arrived at the new category. The inadequacy of such a point of view, and the necessity for transcending it, are obvious. It is quite impossible that a mere unity, without any plurality about it, should be able to account for a plurality. This would involve a spontaneous self-differentiation of the unity which Hegel, in agreement with common-sense, would hold to be impossible. If you put nothing but unity in, you can get nothing but unity out. The growth of the dialectic does not give an example of the contrary. In the first place the dialectic, though it develops, never differentiates itself (cp. *MIND*, 1897, p. 357). In the second place, as I have pointed out elsewhere (*Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*), the real spring of the dialectic movement lies in the implicit concrete truth, which it proceeds to render explicit, and not in the already explicit abstraction from which it starts. Thus in the growth of the dialectic, as elsewhere, it remains true that something can never grow out of nothing. Now the category of Chemism involves an attempt to get something out of nothing. The unified plurality of the relations is to be accounted for by the bare unity of the base. And this would leave the plurality unaccounted for and illegitimate.

The undifferentiated unity of the base of the relations can thus no longer be maintained. At the same time, it is impossible to get rid of it by simply taking this base as plural. For then we should be back in the category of Absolute Mechanism, and this we have already seen to be unsatisfactory. It is clear that we can only get out of the difficulty by finding a new category which shall synthesise Mechanism and Chemism, and remove the defects of both.

This is the argument I should propose to substitute for Hegel's treatment of Chemism. It so far resembles his that the abstract and excessive plurality in Mechanism is replaced here by an equally abstract and excessive unity. But it is by no means the same category. It is true that there seems another resemblance in the way in which, in each case, the argument ends with an oscillation—in Hegel's view between the neutral object and the extremes, in my view, between the standpoints of Absolute Mechanism and Chemism. But this resemblance is deceptive, for there is a vital difference between an alternation of categories and a category of alternation. Now Hegel's view, as I said before, is a category of alternation—if we look at things by his category of Chemism we regard the things themselves as oscillating between different states. The alternation, in my view, on the contrary, is nothing but that state of perplexity and contradiction which always arises when a Thesis and Antithesis, which are contrary to one another, have been developed to their full extent, and the Synthesis, at the same time, has not yet presented itself for their reconciliation.¹ Each category, because of its inherent contradiction, leads to its contrary, and rest can only be found in the Synthesis.

With this change there disappears whatever appropriateness the name of Chemism originally possessed. Indeed, it seems probable to me that the associations of this name are responsible for Hegel's own unsatisfactory treatment of the category. Since the category before it was most appropriately named after Mechanics, and its successor was closely connected with the idea of End, it was tempting to carry the analogy one step farther, and name the middle category from Chemistry. And, having done this, Hegel, I venture to think, for once distorted the category to suit the name. The conceptions of the neutral object, and of the oscillation between the neutral object and the connected extremes, have

¹ Of course it is not the case that every Antithesis stands to its Thesis in the relation of a direct contrary. Indeed, a triad of this type is seldom found so near the end of the dialectic.

nothing, that I can see, to do with the course of the argument before or after them, but it is manifest at once that they are closely analogous to chemical processes.

I do not venture to rechristen the amended category. But I will point out that a good example of it might be found in Hegel's own exposition of the Hindu religion. Here all the multiplicity and differentiation of the world is referred to and accounted for by a unity so abstract as to explain nothing, and in reality to be nothing—for the difference between such a Pantheism as this and Bouddha's Atheism is infinitesimal. Such a blank unity is totally unable to explain the plurality, and accordingly is only really prominent in those moods of the worshipper when he can fix his entire attention on the unity of things, ignoring their differences. When the latter are to be taken into account, he has to regard some sort of difference as fundamental, thus going back to the category of Absolute Mechanism. And, because the unity declines to admit the reality of this difference, it is impotent to control it in any way. It is, as Hegel points out, for this reason that a religion which is on one side the most restrained and rigid monism, is on the other the wildest and most unrestrained polytheism.¹

We have seen, then, that our attempts to make either differentiation or unity fundamental by itself have broken down. Reality is a differentiated unity—or a unified plurality, and neither element can be deduced from the other. We must therefore adopt a theory of reality which puts both elements on the same level, and makes them both fundamental. Reality must be a unity differentiated into plurality, for which the differentiation and the plurality are as essential and necessary as the unity. Or it can be expressed from the other end—reality is a plurality combined into a unity, for which the combination and the unity are as essential and necessary as the plurality. This gives us the category which Hegel calls—

TELEOLOGY.

The advance in this category on the two which precede it does not lie in its recognising the existence of both unity and multiplicity. For Mechanism recognises, admittedly, a unity as well as a plurality, and I have endeavoured to show that Chemism recognises a plurality as well as a unity. The difference is that the two lower categories take, each of them,

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (*Werke*, vol. xi., p. 380. Speirs' trans., vol. ii., p. 44).

one of these two ideas to be fundamental, and tries to account for the other from it, while Teleology recognises both of them to be equally fundamental.

In doing this Hegel attacks one of the strongest prejudices of the "non-speculative" mind. There are few things of which common sense feels more sure than that the same reality cannot be both One and Many. There may be a little differentiation in the One, a little unity in the Many. But that anything should be fundamentally and necessarily as much One as Many, as much Many as One, seems to it to be impossible. Against this prejudice of the natural man the dialectic continually directs its forces, but at this point more explicitly than ever before. We have here—even more distinctly than at the end of the Subjective Notion—the idea of a self-differentiating unity, by which is to be understood, as I have explained elsewhere,¹ not a blank unity which produces differentiations out of its inner nothingness, but a unity which, not through some external accident, but from inner necessity, is only to be found in a multiplicity which is as fundamental as itself. The term self-differentiating unity is rather misleading. The active participle suggests a logical if not a temporal process, and so leads us to suppose that the unity is the agent which produces the difference, and is therefore prior to it. This might to some extent be remedied if we were to realise that it would be just as true to say a self-unifying differentiation as a self-differentiating unity, though the suggestion of action would still remain inappropriate.

This doctrine is interesting as being one which has, mainly through the influence of Hegel, penetrated from metaphysics to everyday life. Common sense is not quite so certain as it used to be, that the One cannot also be the Many. The idea of a self-differentiating unity, generally under the more picturesque name of an organic unity, has worked itself into a place among the furniture of the average mind, and is perhaps being used with rather reckless freedom. Still it must be regarded as one of the most valuable of the presents which metaphysics has made to an ungrateful world.

Hegel departs considerably from the common usage in the meaning which he gives to Teleology, and still more with End and Means, which with him signify respectively the aspects of unity and plurality. What we generally mean by Teleology is what Hegel calls "finite and outward design," in which some independently existing object is used by some

¹ MIND, 1897, p. 356.

self-conscious being as a means for carrying out some plan which he has conceived. In "outward design" the Means and the End can exist independently—for the End can exist as a purpose in the mind of the agent, even if there are no possible Means to carry it out; while the objects which are used as Means do not derive their entire existence from that use, but existed before the End was formed, and would still have existed if it had never been formed.

It is clear that this is entirely different from the idea of Teleology at which the dialectic has now arrived, in which the End has no existence, and indeed no meaning at all, except in so far as it is manifested in the Means, while the Means are equally devoid of meaning and existence except in so far as they carry out the End. Hegel's Teleology corresponds, as he remarks himself, to Kant's idea of Inner Design; the best example of which is the unity in multiplicity of an organic being.

The use by Hegel of the words End and Means here seems to me very unfortunate. For, in ordinary language, the cardinal point in the significance of these terms is that the Means, as Means, exist only for the sake of the End, while the End exists for its own sake. The End has ultimate value, the Means only derivative value. Now there is nothing of this sort in the Hegelian use of the words. The whole point of the category is, as we have seen, that the plurality, which he calls the Means, is just as fundamental and important as the unity, which he calls the End. But the contrary is almost irresistibly suggested by the associations of the words, and even Hegel himself seems sometimes to forget in what a different sense from the common one he is professing to use them. To his use of the word Teleology there seems much less objection.

It is to be noted that, using the words in Hegel's sense, there can be no such thing as an unrealised End, or inadequate Means. An End only exists at all in so far as it is the unity which unites the Means—*i.e.*, which is realised by them, and, conversely, the Means only exist in so far as they are unified by, and express, the End, and can therefore offer no resistance to its realisation.

At the same time we must notice that with this use of the words the conception of a realised End loses altogether that implication of *value* which it has when the words are used in their ordinary significance. In the latter case, the conception of a realised End involves value, because, in the first place, it has a distinct meaning. An End entertained is not necessarily realised, and the realisation brings in a

fresh element. And that fresh element is the harmony between the purposes of a self-conscious being on the one hand, and the surrounding reality on the other. This certainly involves pleasure, and, if pleasure be taken as the good, or if the End was in itself moral, it also involves good. And thus, with "finite and outward" Ends, their realisation takes us into the world of values, since, at the lowest, the realisation implies that some sentient being has got what he wanted.

But with Ends, in the Hegelian sense of the word, it is quite different. In the first place, to say that an End is realised is now, as was explained above, a mere tautology. And, in the second place, an End, in this sense, is only the inner unity of existence. It has no necessary relation to any conscious being, and, consequently, no implication of value, which is an unmeaning term apart from consciousness.

Is there one End in the universe or more? Are we to consider all reality as a single system held together by a single End, or is there a plurality of Ends—embracing, of course, a still greater plurality of Means? Hegel does not make this point clear. It seems certain to me, however, that we must regard all reality as forming a single system with a single End. In the first place, if there was more than one End they would be simply juxtaposed, without any connexion, since under this category a plurality can only be united as Means to an End. But juxtaposition without connexion is a standpoint which the dialectic has long ago transcended.

The same view is imposed on us by the manner in which the idea of End has been reached. Each system of Absolute Mechanism was transformed into a system of Chemism, and that, again, into a Teleological system. It would seem, then, as if there ought to be a Teleological system for each system of Absolute Mechanism, of which there were many. But it must be remembered that each of these Mechanical systems comprised just the same Objects—since each of them extended over the whole universe. The only difference between them lay in the fact that each of them took a different Object for its centre. Now the centre of union of a Teleological system is not one of the Objects which form the system, but the unity behind it which Hegel calls the End. And therefore all these systems of Ends and Means will turn out to be the same system. For the Means are the same in each case—since each system has the plurality of the whole universe as its Means—and the same Means cannot possibly have two different Ends. If we call the Means x , and the Ends A

and B, we see that, A and B being different, x cannot manifest A by the same qualities with which it manifests B. There must therefore be some part of x which does not manifest A, and some part which does not manifest B. That is to say, neither A nor B could be the true End of x , since neither of them would correspond to the whole of it, and the part of x which did not correspond to either End would not be unified by it.

Only one End therefore can be capable of uniting as its Means all the plurality of the universe, and as no system can stop short of embracing the whole universe, we must regard the whole of reality as forming a single system, with a single End.

The conception of End—in the Hegelian sense—may perhaps be profitably compared to Lotze's conception of the unity which he calls M, by which all the particular Things in the world are united. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if this M could be better compared with a system in Absolute Mechanism. It is easy to take it as if it were altogether secondary to the particular Things, and as if its only function was to pass on to one Thing the impulses received from another. But we must remember, first, that without M the Things would have no relations, and be absolutely isolated—that is, would not exist at all. Therefore it is absolutely essential to the Things, and not secondary. And, secondly, Lotze asks us to “admit the supposition that the susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite Being—a susceptibility in virtue of which it does not experience changes without maintaining itself against them by reaction—that this belongs also to the one, the truly existing M” (*Metaphysic*, section 70). Now this gives M a nature of its own. No doubt this nature is only expressible in Things, but still it is not a mere consequence of Things. The unity is as essential a side of the truth as the plurality. And this is very like the category of End. (I may be permitted to remark in passing that this ascription of a definite nature to M seems absolutely incompatible with the view, sometimes held, that Lotze can be correctly described as a Monadist.)

SUBJECTIVE END.

The full unity between Means and End, however, is not attained till we reach the last division of Teleology. At first they are regarded as of equal importance, indeed, and as closely united, but yet as being still separate entities in the sense that each has a nature of its own, though it could

not exist except in conjunction with the other. This view dominates the first two subdivisions of Teleology, the first of which, called by Hegel the Subjective End, regards the Means as possessing no definite quality of their own except that they are a plurality. One Object is as good as another in any place, or for the manifestation of any particular part of the End. If in an Object A there is manifested the End in the shape of x , that does not mean that there is any special fitness in A to manifest x . B, or any other Object, would have done quite as well. All that the Objects are wanted for, is to provide a plurality. All the content is in the End alone.

This is naturally the first form the category would take. For the immediate cause of the breaking down of the category of Chemism was that it was impossible to get the plurality out of unity. So that it was natural at first to look elsewhere only for the mere element of plurality, and to think that that once given, the unity could supply all the rest.

The contradiction involved in this category is not hard to discover. For, while it asserts the Means to have separate natures, apart from that End which they carry out, it defines the Means so as to reduce this separate nature, and consequently the Means themselves to nothing.

The interconnexions of the various Means with one another form the End, which the Means carry out. The End is the unity of the Means, and it is clearly to the End that these interconnexions, which unite the Means to one another, must be referred. Now the present category asserts that one Means would always do as well as another in carrying out the End, consequently, that the intrinsic nature of the Means has no relation to the End. It follows that the intrinsic nature of the Means has no relation to the connexion between the different Means. These connexions, however, form the whole of the external nature of the Objects which are considered as Means, and we saw, when we were dealing with Absolute Mechanism, that the inner nature only expresses itself through the outer. Therefore this intrinsic nature which the Means are asserted to possess can neither be their outer nor their inner nature—and what else is there left for it to be? Clearly nothing. To suggest that anything has a core of its own apart from and unaffected by its relations to other things would be to go back to the earlier categories of Essence, whose insufficiency has been demonstrated much earlier in the dialectic.

The one quality, indeed, which the Means might seem to

possess, apart from the End, was the plurality by which they were enabled to break up the unity of the End. But, if they are taken apart from the End, even their plurality vanishes. For the End is their only unity, and plurality without *some* unity is impossible. You can only take things together if they have a unity, and if you do not take them together, they are not a plurality. If we consider each of the Means without the End it is absolutely isolated, and in absolute isolation it can have no plurality. It is a mere blank unity—*i.e.*, nothing.

To suppose, then, that the Means have no intrinsic adaptation to the End, is to destroy the possibility of their having an intrinsic nature at all. If, therefore, they are still to retain any externality whatever to the End, that externality must be harmonious to the End. The private nature of each Means must simply consist of its fitness to carry out the End—for we have seen that there is nothing else for it to be. With this change, it ceases to be indifferent which Means are employed in carrying out a particular part of the End. Only those Means can do so which are fitted for the task by their own nature. We thus approach more closely in one respect to the ordinary significance of the word Means, which includes some special capability in the Object to carry out the End. It is for this reason that Hegel calls the next division of Teleology—

MEANS.

Of course, here as elsewhere, we must remember the special meaning which End has for Hegel. Though the Means have a certain externality to, and distinction from, the End, yet it is not supposed that they could exist apart from it. The position throughout Teleology is that the Means could not exist if they did not embody the End, nor the End if it were not embodied by the Means. Accordingly, to speak here of the Means as *fitted* to embody the End may be misleading. It is not a mere potentiality, as when, in the non-Hegelian meaning of the terms, we say that a knife is the means of committing murder. They would not be Means unless they *did* embody the End, and when we speak of them as being fitted for it, we only mean that their intrinsic nature co-operates in the process, and is not to be considered, as it was in the last subdivision, as indifferent to the End.

How, we must now inquire, does this category manifest its inadequacy? Hegel gives two demonstrations of this, the first of which is to be found in the *Greater Logic*

only, while the second is to be found in the *Smaller Logic* also. They may be said to be based on the same general principle, but are perfectly distinct points and must be treated separately.

In the first (*Werke*, vol. v., p. 229) he says that if we accepted the position of this category we should be forced to insert, between the End and the Means, a second Means, and then, between the End and this second Means, a third Means, and so on *ad infinitum*, and that this involves a contradiction. Let us expand this argument rather more than Hegel does himself, and examine its validity.

If the End and the Means are to be taken as distinguishable entities, then it is clear that each of them must correspond to all the conditions which are necessary to the existence of any entity. Now we have seen, over and over again, in the course of the dialectic, that no entity of any sort can be a blank or undifferentiated unity. Therefore, the End cannot be such a unity. It must be differentiated. This, indeed, has already been admitted, and the work of the Means is to differentiate it. But—and here the root of the contradiction appears—if the End has an existence distinguishable from the Means, it must have a differentiation distinguishable from the Means. Now the End is fundamentally a unity, and we have seen in the breakdown of Chemism that a unity cannot produce its own differentiation, but must have an element of differentiation which is correlative to, and not derived from, the unity.

Within the End, therefore, and apart from the Means, there must be an element of differentiation. But the definition of a Means, as we have seen, is just the plurality which differentiates a unity in this way, and this element of differentiation will be a second Means, between the End and the first Means. And now that it is a Means, it will, by the category which we are considering, be distinguishable from the End. By the same reasoning as before, the End will require some differentiation independent of the Means, and this differentiation will become a third Means, between the End and the second Means. And this process will go on *ad infinitum*.

Such an infinite process as this is clearly a sign of error. By the hypothesis the End and the original Means are united. But for this union an infinite series of intermediate Means are required. The End and the original Means can only be united when this infinite series is completed—that is to say, they never can be united. And so the category is contradictory.

Hegel's second argument (*Enc.*, section 211, *Werke*, vol. v., p. 230) is that the Realised End will, if we adhere to our present category, be nothing but a Means, that it will consequently require another Realised End beyond it, which in turn will be nothing but a Means, and so on *ad infinitum*. This also will require some expansion.

When we use the word End in its common and un-Hegelian sense, there is a clear distinction between the Means and the Realised End. A saw and a plank may be taken as Means to the End of making sawdust, but no one could mistake either a saw or a plank for the actual sawdust which is the Realised End. But in the Hegelian sense of End the case is different. For here the Means is not an Object which might be made to subserve the End. It is an Object which does subserve it, and subserve it necessarily and by its intrinsic nature. The Means therefore is an Object whose nature is such that it manifests the End. (If we are speaking of a single Object it is better, except for brevity, to say "which participates in manifesting the End," since of course an End can only be manifested in a plurality of Means.)

Now what is the Realised End? Is it anything more than this? It can be nothing more. The only form a Realised End can take is that of an Object whose nature is such that it manifests the End. And therefore, for Hegelian Teleology, there is no difference between the Means and the Realised End.

This conclusion we shall find later on to be the truth. But it is inconsistent with our present position, and the attempt to combine the two produces a contradiction. For the Realised End is the union of the End and Means, and, if these are taken as in any way distinguishable, it cannot be the same as either of them. Hence when we find that our Realised End is identical with the Means, we cannot regard it as really the Realised End. If it is one extreme of the relation it cannot be the union of both. We take it then simply as the Means, and look for another Realised End beyond it. (We may remark, for completeness' sake, that it would have been equally possible to take it as the Realised End, and then to look for another Means to mediate between it and the End. -The course of the argument would be similar.) But the new Realised End would also necessarily be identical with the Means, for the same reasons as before, and our search would have to be continued *ad infinitum*. Such an infinite process would involve a contradiction, for it is the whole nature of the End and Means

to be united, and they can never be united, since it would require the completion of the infinite process.

The category which involves such contradictions must, of course, be transcended. And we have already seen how this may be done. The whole of the difficulty arose from the fact that End and Means were taken as separate realities. It was this that forced us to insert, between Means and End, an infinite series of new Means. And it was this which gave us the choice of either inserting another infinite series of Means between Means and Realised End, or else of prolonging the series of Means forward in the vain attempt to reach a Realised End which was different from a Means. We can get rid of the contradictions only by dropping our supposition that End and Means are in any way separate realities. We have known all along that they would only exist if they were connected. But now we are driven to the conclusion that they cannot exist if there is anything in either of them *except* its connexion with the other. The whole nature of the End is just to unify those Means, the whole nature of the Means is just to manifest that End. With this we pass to the final division of Teleology, to which Hegel gives the name of—

REALISED END.

The appropriateness of this name lies in the fact that the Realised End is the unity of the End and Means, and that we have now come to the conclusion that End and Means are not two realities connected with one another, but two aspects distinguishable within a single reality. The unity of the two sides is not built up, as previously, from their difference, but the difference is an analysis of the unity. And thus this category takes its name from the unity of the two sides—that is to say, from the Realised End.

We have thus arrived at the close of the Objective Notion. We have overcome the unbalanced abstractions of Mechanism and Chemism, and, instead of a mere plurality or mere unity, have found the basis of all reality in a reality of which plurality and unity are correlative and complementary aspects—each without any claim to an existence apart from its union with the other.

The Objective Notion ends with the conception of a self-differentiating unity, as the Subjective Notion had ended before it. But the conception is now a far deeper one. The self-differentiating unity of the Disjunctive Laws of Nature only reached the proposition that every A must be either B, C or D. But it was still possible that they were all B, and

that AC and AD were unrepresented species. If all carnivora must be lions, tigers, or wolves, that would not prove that any of them were tigers or wolves. If the world had been so differently constituted that there were no tigers or wolves, that would have made no difference to the lions. (That is to say, it would have made no difference to them from the point of view of the Subjective Notion. The lions would not be affected by the disappearance of another subdivision of the class to which they belonged. In so far as they were objects in the same world, any change in the tigers would affect the lions, but that does not belong to the Subjective Notion.)

It is quite different with the self-differentiating unity of End. There A is B, C, *and* D—not B, C, *or* D—for it is only in all the Means taken together that the End is manifested. Thus End and Means form a unity whose parts completely determine one another. The End determines the Means, since only one particular set of Means could express a given End. And, no less, the Means determine the End, since, when the Means are given, there is only one possible End which can be manifested by them. And, lastly, the various Means reciprocally determine one another. For none of the Means could be altered without altering the End, and this would alter all the other Means.

With this the Objective Notion closes. The next step will take us into the last subdivision of the Logic—the Idea.